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At the age of ten German pupils are given a secondary school track recommendation which 
largely determines the actual track choice. Track choice has major effects on the life course, 
mainly through labor market outcomes. Using data from the German PISA extension study, 
we analyze the effect of month of birth and thus relative age on such recommendations. We 
find that younger pupils are less often recommended to and actually attend Gymnasium, the 
most attractive track in terms of later life outcomes. Flexible enrolment and grade retention 
partly offset these inequalities and the relative age effect dissipates as students age. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the most debated features of the German schooling system is the early selection 
of students into different secondary school tracks. At the end of primary school (usually at the 
age of ten), German pupils are typically given a more or less binding (depending on the state) 
recommendation which type of secondary school they should visit. This recommendation and 
the ensuing decision has major effects on the entire life course, mainly through labor market 
outcomes (see e.g. Dustmann 2004). Of the three main secondary school tracks (Hauptschule, 
Realschule, and Gymnasium), Gymnasium is the most academic and prestigious, and it is the 
only track that provides direct entry into tertiary education. Upon finishing Gymnasium 
successfully, children in Germany are awarded a general university-entrance diploma. While 
mobility between tracks is desirable and possible in theory, factual mobility between tracks is 
low. If there is mobility, it is usually downward, from more to less academic tracks, i.e., 
children who do not meet the standards of their school are referred to a less academic school. 
Incidence of upward mobility is rare. Thus, the decision made at the end of primary school 
effectively limits the educational opportunities of children. For instance, in our data 
(described below), less than 5 percent of the students who had not received a recommendation 
for Gymnasium visited Gymnasium in grade 9, but 21 percent of those who had received a 
recommendation did not attend Gymnasium in grade 9. 
A possible justification for school tracking is efficiency (Hallinan 1994, Brunello & 
Giannini 2004). Homogeneous classrooms provide a learning environment that is better 
adapted to the abilities of the individual pupil. Ability differences between the high- and low-
achieving students in a class are smaller than in comprehensive school systems and allow 
more focussed instruction without leaving the weakest pupils behind or have better students 
be underchallenged by the curriculum. Overall, according to proponents of tracking, tracking 
will benefit weak and strong pupils alike, leading to better aggregate educational outcomes. 
However, PISA 2000 and 2003 yield some evidence that first, Germany's tracked 
school system was not as successful as many thought. On the contrary, Germany ended up in 
the bottom half of the "PISA league", whereas many of its neighboring countries performed 
better. Actually, this was already the result of the TIMSS study five years before the first 
PISA study (see e.g. Jürges & Schneider, 2004), which went largely unnoticed by the broader 
public. Second, among all PISA countries, Germany is the country where the individual 
background has the largest impact on a child's educational outcome (Artelt et al. 2001). 
Apparently, the German school system fails in creating "equality of opportunity" for all 
children. Third, children from disadvantaged backgrounds are particularly vulnerable of being   2
"left behind" by the education system. While better performing students in Germany are on a 
similar level as those in neighboring countries, weaker students in Germany perform much 
worse than weaker students in many other countries. 
The three issues are interrelated, and early educational tracking in Germany could be 
part of the explanation. Opponents of tracking argue that it might not only create inequalities 
in opportunity and a bias against disadvantaged students but that it might also be inefficient in 
the sense that creating a learning environment for weaker children with peers of similar ability 
will harm them more than increasing the learning speed will improve the achievement of  the 
more gifted children. The aggregate performance can thus suffer from tracking. In fact, a 
recent cross-national study sheds light on the efficiency and equity aspects of secondary 
school tracking. Using several primary and middle school datasets from TIMSS and PISA and 
comparing countries with and without educational tracking, Hanushek & Wößmann (2006) 
find that tracking after primary school increases educational inequality and reduces aggregate 
performance. 
While this research suggests that tracking might not be a good idea in the first place, 
the present paper studies potential inefficiencies of the German tracking system that would 
also be harmful if tracking increased aggregate performance. In the following, we analyze the 
determinants of secondary school track recommendations made by teachers and the actual 
choices made by parents (and students). Since teachers' recommendations are typically based 
on the academic achievement of the individual pupil in primary school, one expects of course 
a major impact of family background on the recommendations. Our primary interest, 
however, is to analyze the effect of relative age. Since enrolment is only once a year, the age-
range within a class is at least one year. Being a year older when the recommendation is made 
in fourth grade could increase one's chances to be sent to Gymnasium. The reason is that at 
the age of ten, one year of age difference could also make a difference in terms of maturity 
and academic achievement (in the following, we generally focus on Gymnasium 
recommendations versus Haupt-/Realschule recommendations). 
If there is an effect of relative age on the recommended and chosen secondary school 
track, this has two immediate consequences. First, it might pay for parents to hold back their 
children for another year to provide them with better educational chances and thus better 
chances in life ("redshirting"). Second, relative age is largely determined by chance, i.e. by a 
child's birth day in relation to an arbitrary cut-off date. Thus, if we identify an age effect on 
track recommendations, the system is unfair in the sense that it creates avoidable inequality of 
access based on a random event. The second point is of utmost policy relevance. Teachers   3
should recommend students based on their assessment of future academic performance. If 
teachers' recommendations are biased towards older students because at the end of primary 
school they are on average more mature and show better academic performance, these 
recommendations must not be made binding. In any case, teachers' guidelines for 
recommendations should mention the potential age bias so that teachers are aware of it when 
they make the recommendation.
1
A number of recent economic studies has analyzed birthday effects on academic 
achievement, for instance years of schooling (Angrist & Krueger, 1992), standardized test 
results (Bedard & Dhuey 2006; Datar 2006; Strøm 2004; Leuven, Lindahl, Oosterbeek & 
Webbink, 2004; Frederiksson & Öckert 2004; Puhani & Weber; 2005), grade retention (Eide 
& Showalter, 2001), or factual secondary track choice (Fertig & Kluve, 2005; Puhani & 
Weber; 2005), and on labor market performance (Frederiksson & Öckert 2004). Challenging 
the conventional view that children gain by starting school at an older age, Angrist & Krueger 
(1992) find that children who enter primary school at an older age attain slightly less 
education. However, this finding is largely due to the U.S. schooling laws, which allow pupils 
to leave school when they turn 16 (i.e., they do not need to finish the class they have started). 
Datar (2006) studies the effect of age at kindergarten entrance on mathematics and 
reading achievement levels and test score gains in the first two years of school. She finds that 
a one year delay in kindergarten entrance leads to significantly higher test scores at 
kindergarten entry in both subjects and also – which is more interesting – to greater test score 
gains. The effects are somewhat stronger for children from disadvantaged backgrounds. 
Strøm (2004) finds that Norwegian children born in the first months of the year have 
significantly better test scores in PISA 2000 (i.e. at age 15) than those born in the last months. 
Norway has very strict enrolments laws that require children born in the same calendar year to 
start school at the same time (the cut-off date is December 31
st). January-born children have 
on average 0.2 standard deviations better results in PISA than December-born children. 
Frederiksson & Öckert (2004) use Swedish register data and find quantitatively very similar 
effects of age at school entry on academic performance in ninth grade (the cut-off birth date 
for school entry in Sweden is also December 31
st). 
The evidence for Germany is somewhat mixed. Fertig & Kluve (2004), using 
retrospective survey data, do not find any significant effect of age at school entry on 
                                                           
1 We have studied recommendation guidelines for two German states (Baden-Württemberg, 
Berlin). None of them explicitly mentions relative age as a factor to be taken into account 
when formulating the recommendation.   4
educational performance. Their dependent variables are the likelihood of repeating a class and 
the leaving certificate eventually attained by a child. In contrast, Puhani & Weber (2007) find 
positive and strong effects of school entry age on standardized test scores at the end of 
primary schools (using PIRLS data) and the likelihood of attending a more academic school 
track (using administrative data for the state of Hessen). 
Bedard & Dhuey (2006) present the most comprehensive study to date of relative age 
at school entry effects. Using data from TIMSS 1995 and 1999, and studying 19 different 
countries (but not Germany), they find significant age effects on test scores in all countries. 
What is more important, the size of the effect systematically varies across countries. The age 
effect is largest in those countries where compliance to the cut-off date rule is nearly perfect: 
England, Iceland, Japan, and Norway. They also find that grade retention and late enrolment 
(i.e. systematic deviations of the actual age of a 4
th grader, say, from the assigned age) reduce 
the age effect by about one third. 
It is not surprising that relative age effects – especially at young ages – are 
omnipresent.
2 The important question is whether such initial disadvantages in life have long-
lasting effects. The German school system gives more reason to worry in this respect than 
other countries' systems. Birthday effects may be long-lasting because children are separated 
early (at the age of ten) into different secondary school types. This separation is based on a 
recommendation given by the primary school. Clearly, the teacher's recommendation should 
not only reflect the current ability but also include a forecast on future development of the 
child. Such forecast should certainly not be affected by the relative age of a child in 4
th grade. 
We estimate the effect of relative age on Gymnasium recommendation and follow 
students from primary school to 9
th grade to see whether the age effect dissipates over time. 
This could be true if for instance students do not adhere to the recommendation when they 
enter secondary school or change school types in the course of secondary school. Using data 
from the German PISA 2000 extension study (PISA-E), we find that relative age at 
recommendation has a significant and sizeable effect on teacher's recommendations to enter 
Gymnasium. Younger pupils are less often recommended to Gymnasium. Since relative age at 
school entry is largely driven by institutional birth date regulations concerning school entry, 
this type of recommendation bias is arbitrary. We also find that early and late enrolment, non-
compliance with the recommendation, and grade retention partly offset this bias, thereby 
confirming the effectiveness of these policies in reducing possible inequalities in education 
                                                           
2 Relative age effects appear to be particularly pronounced in competitive environments such 
as sports (see. e.g. Barnsley et al. 1985, 1992).   5
opportunities. Further, the relative age effect dissipates as students get older but does not 
vanish. This is mostly due to selective Gymnasium drop-outs. Finally, we find no evidence 
that postponing the recommendation by another two years, for instance by extending primary 
schools to six years or introducing a two year orientation stage between primary and 
secondary school, reduces the age bias in a quantitatively or statistically significant way. 
Our study adds to the literature in several ways. First, it uses an alternative data source 
for Germany (PISA-E). Second, it looks at track choice recommendations at the end of 
primary school as the outcome variable and third, it combines the literature on relative age 
effects with the literature on educational tracking in a novel way, leading to important policy 
conclusions for the practice of educational tracking in Germany. 
 
2. Institutional background 
We now give a brief description of the German school system, where we emphasize 
those aspects that are most relevant for understanding the importance of secondary school 
track recommendations in the German context. Figure 1 gives a stylized overview of primary 
and secondary education in Germany (see Jonen and Eckardt (2006) for a detailed description 
of the German school system). 
All children in Germany attend primary school, which covers grades 1 to 4, and in two 
states (Berlin and Brandenburg) grades 1 to 6. There is no formal exit examination at the end 
of primary schooling. Rather, students are allocated to one of the three secondary school types 
on the basis of their general performance in primary school. If the primary school (teacher) 
considers a child suitable for a certain type of secondary school, the child will be admitted 
without any special admission procedure. If the primary school's recommendations conflict 
with the parents' wishes, however, the final decision about the future course of education lies 
either with the parents, the secondary school, or the school supervisory authority, depending 
on the state laws. 
The Hauptschule, Realschule, and Gymnasium are the three main types of secondary 
schools; each leads to a specific leaving certificate. The Hauptschule provides its students 
with basic general education, and usually comprises grades 5 to 9 (or 10 in some states). The 
Realschule provides a more extensive general education, usually comprising grades 5 to 10. 
The  Gymnasium  provides an in-depth general education covering both lower and upper 
secondary level, and usually comprises grades 5 to 12 or 13 (depending on the state). 
Depending on their academic performance, students can switch between school types. 
Downward mobility is more common than upward mobility. A fourth type of school, the   6
Gesamtschule (comprehensive school), does not appear in this graph. The comprehensive 
school offers all lower secondary level leaving certificates, as well as providing upper 
secondary education. However, it does not exist in all states, and where it exists, it usually 
plays a minor role, with less than 10 percent of all children attending a comprehensive school. 
Yet another type of secondary school, the Orientierungsstufe will play a role in our analyses 
later on. After attending primary school for four years, students in the states of Niedersachsen 
and Bremen move on to a two year orientation stage. The orientation stage can be either 
organized as an independent school or be part of a primary or secondary school (actually, in 
both states, the orientation stage has been abolished recently). The objective of the orientation 
stage has been to allow students a smoother transition between primary and secondary 
schools. 
 
Vocational track (dual system)

































Figure 1: The German school system 
 
As in most other countries, age at school entry in Germany is defined relative to a 
specific cut-off date. Until recent years, this date was June 30
th in West Germany and May 
31
st in the former GDR. These cut-off dates applied to all children in our sample. The rule is 
that children who turn 6 on or before June 30
th are admitted to primary school in that school 
year, which starts in August or early September. Children who turn 6 after June 30
th are 
admitted to primary school one year later (in recent years, many states in Germany have 
deferred the cut-off date by three, sometimes even six months, admitting ever younger 
children to primary school).    7
If everyone complied with the cut-off date rule and if there was no grade retention, the 
oldest children in a class (born in July or June, respectively) would always be eleven month 
older than the youngest (born in June or May, respectively). In this paper we estimate how 
this age difference affects the secondary school track recommendation given by the primary 
school in fourth grade. We are also interested in how flexible enrolment and grade retention 
modify the age effect. 
Before children are admitted to primary school, they have to pass some basic maturity 
test. Children who are old enough to enter school, but do not pass this test, are admitted to 
primary school one year later (late enrolment). Children who are born after the cut-off date 
(but before Dec 31
st) may be admitted to school provided they pass the maturity test (early 
enrolment). In both cases (late and early enrolments), the final decision is made by the 
primary school principal, who tends to follow the request of the parents. Moreover, children 
who do not fulfil minimal performance criteria are not promoted to the next grade. The 
decision not to promote lies entirely with the school but children may repeat classes on their 
own (or their parents') demand. 
 
3. Estimation strategy 
We compute two sets of estimates for two different subsamples. The first set contains 
the results of linear regressions (with heteroskedasticity-consistent  standard errors) of 
Gymnasium recommendations and Gymnasium attendance on the assigned relative age at 
recommendation. These are reduced form regressions that show the net effect of month of 
birth created by the German education system. This effect is the most policy relevant in terms 
of describing inequalities in educational access due to the way the school system is organized. 
If we found no age effect in the reduced from regressions, this could be because there was no 
month of birth effect in the first place or the system was flexible enough to offset these age 
effects. The possibilities of early and late enrolment or grade retention and skipping, 
introduces some flexibility that could possibly counteract the age effect. 
The second set of estimates contains the results of instrumental variables regressions 
of Gymnasium recommendations on the actual age at recommendation, using assigned 
relative age as instruments. These estimates can only be different from the first set of 
regressions if actual age is not always identical to assigned relative age, i.e. if a non-random 
selection of students enrol early or late or repeat classes. In contrast to earlier studies using the 
same instrumental variables strategy, we are not primarily interested in the IV estimates but in 
the difference between the reduced form and the IV results. The IV approach provides an   8
estimate of the month of birth effect that we could expect if there was no possibility of early 
and late enrolment or grade retention and skipping. These results are of primary interest in 
studies that aim at estimating the effect of relative age on student achievement taking account 
of the confounding effect of selective enrolment or grade retention. In our context, the 
difference between the IV estimate and the reduced form regressions is more interesting 
however, because it identifies the effect of the flexible enrolment policy on the chances of 
getting Gymnasium recommendations and visiting Gymnasium. 
We estimate reduced form and IV regressions first on the full sample and then on a 
restricted sample, where sample members are only those students who were born immediately 
before and after the threshold. In West Germany these are the June and July born, in East 
Germany these are the May and June born, respectively. The purpose of this exercise is to 
substantiate the claim that month of birth is in fact exogenous, i.e. uncorrelated with any 
relevant omitted or unobserved individual characteristics. We argue that while there may be 
seasonal variation in fertility that is correlated with family characteristics, birth planning is 
sufficiently imprecise to consider it random (and thus uncorrelated with any potential 
unobserved confounders) whether a child is born a few weeks before or after the school entry 
cut-off date. Also, any other potential seasonal variation of characteristics with month of birth 
(health, personality) should be negligible in our restricted sample. 
Finally, we also compute each model with and without the inclusion of a few 
important individual background variables, thereby controlling for possible correlations 
between birth dates and observed background. 
 
4. Data description 
The data used in this study are drawn from the extension to the German PISA 2000 
study (PISA-E), which are downloadable from the website of the German 
Kultusministerkonferenz (www.kmk.org).
3 PISA-E is described in detail in Baumert et al. 
(2003). In particular, we use the sample that contains information on children who visited 9
th 
grade in 2000, independent of their age. The total sample after deleting cases of item non-
response contains data on 26,112 students from all 16 German states. 
The data contain detailed retrospective information on the school career of the children 
up to grade 9, including age at school entry, whether classes were repeated (and which), as 
well as track choice recommendations and actual track choices in grades 5, 7, and 9. The latter 
                                                           
3 The members of the Kultusministerkonferenz (KMK) are the state ministers of education.   9
four variables are our main outcome variables. Table 1 shows the proportion of students 
receiving a Gymnasium recommendation and attending Gymnasium in grades 5, 7, and 9, by 
state.  
 
Table 1. Proportion of students receiving Gymnasium (GY) recommendation, and attending Gymnasium in 
grades 5, 7, and 9, by state and type of primary school (in percent). 
 
 




Grade 5  Grade 7  Grade 9  N 
Four year primary schools           
 Saarland  37.7 37.1 33.1 32.3 1,606 
 Rheinland-Pfalz  39.4 33.3 34.9 33.2 1,672 
 Nordrhein-Westfalen  34.8 33.7 31.2 28.7 1,871 
 Schleswig-Holstein  37.0 38.7 37.6 34.8 1,652 
 Hamburg  66.7 64.1 61.7 59.1 772 
 Mecklenburg-Vorpommern  35.5 28.6 33.0 28.0 2,259 
 Sachsen  39.6 30.1 31.0 28.8 2,211 
 Bayern  42.2 39.8 36.1 34.2 1,546 
 Baden-Württemberg  43.7 39.3 38.2 37.9 1,576 
 Hessen  36.8 28.4 34.2 28.6 1,927 
 Thüringen  37.5 30.7 30.8 28.3 2,368 
 Sachsen-  51.8 48.4 46.7 46.5 1,314 
 Total  (unweighted)  40.2 35.5 35.6 33.1 20,774 
       
Six year primary schools           
 Brandenburg  41.4 4.2  39.0 37.7 1,766 
 Berlin  53.0 8.1  58.6 55.3 810 
       
Four year primary schools plus orientation stage 
 Niedersachsen  37.1 4.9  40.0 37.5 1,505 
 Bremen  38.1 5.1  41.1 37.2 1,257 
       
Total  (unweighted)  40.4   37.0 34.5 26,112 
 
 
Overall, more than 40 percent of the sample have received a Gymnasium 
recommendation. Actual attendance rates are lower: 37 percent in grade 7 and decreasing to 
34.5 percent in grade 9. This illustrates the fact that during the course of lower secondary 
school more students leave Gymnasium for the less prestigious school tracks than students 
enter Gymnasium. Still, it is remarkable to find that there is a gap between recommendation 
and actual attendance in grade 5. Obviously some parents decide not to send their child to 
Gymnasium despite having received the recommendation.
4 In Table 1, we also find large 
differences in recommendation rates between different states, hence we always control for 
state in the regressions. 
                                                           
4 Some additional analyses show a clear education gradient. Less educated parents are more 
likely not to send their children to Gymnasium although they have a recommendation. 
Conversely, better educated parents are more likely to send their children to Gymnasium   10
 
Table 2: Description of enrolment choices, grade retention and background variables 
 Four  year  primary 
schools 



















Enrolment        
  Early  3.4 49.5 3.1 63.7 5.5 38.6 
  Regular  88.3 41.4 92.5 45.1 81.0 40.3 
  Late  8.3 23.3 4.3 30.4  13.5  20.4 
Repeated  Class        
  No  96.1 41.5 97.8 45.8 92.0 40.2 
  Yes  3.9  7.1  2.2 10.7 8.0  7.3 
Highest  parental  education        
  Hauptschule/POS  8  13.0 16.5  6.2  23.3 19.9 15.8 
  Realschule/  POS  10  16.4 27.6 19.5 27.4 13.7 30.6 
  Fachschule  31.6 33.1 29.4 37.9 26.3 31.2 
  Abitur  11.7 45.7 11.3 48.6 13.0 40.3 
  Fachhochschule  10.3 55.7 11.5 55.6  9.3  51.2 
  University  16.9 70.3 22.2 69.0 17.6 67.8 
Read to child at preschool age 
  Less  than  daily  48.5 31.4 53.1 37.9 44.3 24.9 
  Daily  51.5 48.4 46.9 53.2 55.7 47.6 
Immigrant  Background       
  No  90.7 41.8 96.3 44.8 82.4 40.2 
  Yes  9.3 24.2 3.7 52.1  17.6  25.1 
S e x         
  Boy  48.5 37.0 46.7 39.7 47.4 34.3 
  Girl  51.5 43.2 53.3 49.8 52.6 40.4 
        
Number of observations  20,774  2,576  2,762 
 
 
Table 2 describes, for each primary school type, the prevalence of flexible enrolment 
and grade retention in our sample as well as the individual background variables used in this 
study. Throughout the paper, we follow a parsimonious approach and use only a few but 
crucial key variables to control for the pupil's individual background. In particular, we only 
choose variables that are exogenous in the sense that they are already determined at the time 
of school entry, such as student sex, the highest parental educational attainment, immigrant 
background, and whether parents have read to the child at pre-school age. The table also 
contains some bivariate evidence on the relationship between various characteristics and 
recommendation rates for Gymnasium, in order to illustrate the importance of family 
background for secondary track recommendations and the ensuing choices. 
Early enrolment rates in Germany are fairly low. In our data we find rates of about 3 to 
5 percent. Late enrolment is more than twice as common as early enrolment except in the two 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
although they have not received a recommendation. The most likely explanation is that the 
better educated have different education aspirations.   11
states with six year primary schools. The proportion of students recommended for 
Gymnasium differs substantially between the three enrolment groups. In the group of states 
with four year primary schools, the average recommendation rates for those enrolling early is 
49.5 percent, compared to about 41.4 percent for children who enter school at the regular age, 
and 23.3 percent for those who enter school late. The bivariate relationship between 
enrolment and Gymnasium recommendations suggests that students who enrol early (late) are 
a positive (negative) selection in terms of ability. 
The proportion of students who had to repeat a class in primary school is between 2 
and 8 percent. Again, the low proportion of Gymnasium recommendations among those who 
repeat a class in primary school is very low and suggests that repeating class indicates low 
ability. 
Table 2 also shows a steep gradient between highest parental education and the 
probability of a child to receive a track recommendation for Gymnasium. In states with four 
year primary schools (including those with orientation stage), children whose parents have 
finished university have a 4.3 times higher chance than children whose parents have at most a 
Hauptschule (or POS8, which is the East German equivalent) leaving certificate. With six 
year primary schools, the relative advantage is only 3.0. The difference between primary 
school types is interesting because it indicates that separating children later might reduce 
inequalities in access to better education. Recent research based on large scale achievement 
tests in primary school (e.g. using PIRLS data) suggests that this gradient is not only due to 
the better performance of children with better educated parents (Lehmann & Peek, 1997, Bos 
et al. 2004). Apparently, the social background of a child – which is known to the teacher or 
principal who formulates the recommendation – has an independent influence. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that teachers are often concerned about the lack of "experience" of less 
educated parents with Gymnasium and thus tend to give conservative recommendations. 
Daily reading to a child at pre-school age is associated with a 17 to 23 percentage 
point higher probability of that child receiving a Gymnasium recommendation. This is most 
likely information not known to the teacher and probably reflects differences in parental 
interest in their children's education and associated ability differences. Children with 
immigrant background, i.e., where both parents are born abroad, are up to 17 percentage 
points less likely to receive a Gymnasium recommendation. The difference is smallest in the 
six year primary school states. Again, this indicates that separating children later might be 
beneficial for children from disadvantaged backgrounds.   12
Boys have 6 to 10 percentage point lower chances of being recommended to 
Gymnasium. Again, this confirms earlier findings in the literature (e.g. Lehmann & Peek, 
1997). A possible reason for this finding is that – at the age of 10 to 12 – boys are less mature 
and than girls and thus perform worse when secondary school track recommendations are 
made. However, Lehmann & Peek show that when actual achievement (measured in 
standardized tests) is controlled for, the difference remains. One explanation is that girls 
comply better with other (social) expectations of teachers in primary schools. 
 
5. How flexible enrolment and grade retention affect relative age 
We begin our analysis by studying the relationship between the assigned relative age 
on the one hand and the average relative age at school enrolment and at receiving the 
secondary track recommendation on the other hand. Put differently, we show how flexible 
enrolment and grade retention in primary school affect the average relative age at enrolment 
and recommendation. The purpose of this exercise is to show how and when the initial age 
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Figure 2: The relationship between assigned relative age and actual relative age at school entry and secondary 
track recommendation 
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Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between assigned and actual ages by type of 
primary school. Following Bedard & Dhuey (2006), we coded assigned relative age from 0 
(months) for children born immediately before the cut-off date (the June-born in western 
Germany and the May-born in eastern Germany) to 11 (months) for those born immediately 
after the cut-off date. The dotted lines have a slope of one and show the hypothetical relative 
age at school entry and recommendation if everyone complied to the cut-off date rule. The 
solid lines show the average age at enrolment. They generally have a slope of less than one. 
Students born shortly before the cut-off date are more likely to enrol late than others and 
students born shortly after the cut-off date are more likely to enrol early. In fact, 30 percent of 
those born in the month preceding the cut-off date enrol late compared to two percent of those 
born immediately after the cut-off date. Conversely, 17 percent of the latter group enrol early 
compared to 0.3 percent of the former group. 
As a result the average age difference at school entry of students born immediately 
before and after the cut-off date shrinks from 11 months to less than 6 months (in the four 
year primary school sample). The former are on average older than their assigned age and the 
latter are on average younger. If there is a relative age effect on how primary school teachers 
formulate their secondary school track recommendations or on actual track choices, flexible 
enrolment reduces the average effect on a given cohort of children by about one half (this 
argument is essentially drawing on the difference between the reduced form and the IV 
estimates shown in the next section). 
The dashed lines show the average relative age at recommendation, i.e. in grades 4 and 
6, respectively. They generally lie above the solid lines because grade retention always 
increases the average age. Moreover, the dashed lines are somewhat flatter than the solid 
lines, which indicates that students born shortly before the cut-off date are more likely to 
repeat grades than students after the cut-off date. Grade retention thus further reduces relative 
age difference but compared to flexible enrolment the additional effect is small. 
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6. Birthday effects on secondary track choice 
Our estimation results for the effect of relative age on the probability of Gymnasium 
recommendations and on the probability of actually attending Gymnasium are summarized in 
Tables 3, 4, and 5. In these tables, we only report the parameters of interest, i.e. the table cells 
contain estimated relative age effect obtained from different regression. For instance, Table 3 
contains the results of 32 different regressions: The four rows represent the four dependent 
variables (Gymnasium recommendation and Gymnasium attendance in grades 5, 7, and 9) and 
the columns represent different estimators. Full regression results including the coefficients of 
control variables and first stages of the IV estimators can be obtained from the authors on 
request. 
 
6.1. Four grade primary schools 
We begin our analysis by estimating the net (reduced form) effect of assigned relative 
age on recommendation rates (see columns denoted RF) in the full sample. Our results 
suggest that an eleven month difference in assigned relative age leads to a 10 percentage point 
difference in terms of receiving a Gymnasium recommendation (note that in contrast to the 
preceding section, we now code relative age so that the regression coefficients show the effect 
of eleven months). This holds independent of whether covariates are controlled for or not. A 
ten percentage point difference is about 0.25 times the average probability of getting a 
Gymnasium recommendation and about equal to the difference between having parents with a 
Realschule leaving certificate degree and having parents with a Hauptschule or no leaving 
certificate. The net effect is thus in fact sizeable and – in our view – large enough to warrant a 
reassessment of the system of early tracking. The background characteristics controlled for 
are neither individually not jointly significantly correlated with the assigned relative age, 
which supports the conjecture that the month of birth (relative to the cut-off date) is 
exogenous. 
The columns denoted IV show the results of instrumental variables regressions of the 
chances of getting a Gymnasium recommendation on the actual relative age in fourth grade, 
using assigned relative age as instruments. As explained above, the IV parameter estimates 
the relative age effect if everyone had entered school at the assigned age, i.e., if there was no 
possibility of early or late enrolment, and if there was no grade retention until grade 4. Given 
the selectivity of early and late enrolment and grade retention, it is not surprising that this 
counterfactual is much larger than the net effect of assigned relative age. Comparing the 
estimated effect size of about 17 percentage points to the 10 percentage points net effect   15
suggest that grade retention and enrolment flexibility reduce the relative age disadvantage of 
the young, i.e. those born shortly before the cut-off date, by about 7 percentage points or 
about 40 percent. 
 
Table 3: Reduced form and IV-estimates of relative age effects on the probability of getting a Gymnasium 
recommendation and attending Gymnasium in grades 5, 7, and 9 in states with four grade primary schools (all 
states except Berlin, Brandenburg, Bremen, and Niedersachsen). 
  Full sample (N = 20,774)  Cut-off date sample (N = 3,568) 

















Dependent  variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
GY  recommended  0.096** 0.099** 0.164** 0.170** 0.073** 0.082** 0.147** 0.166** 
  (0.011) (0.010) (0.019) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.034) (0.031) 
          
GY  grade  5  0.078** 0.082** 0.134** 0.140** 0.064** 0.072** 0.128** 0.147** 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.014) (0.033) (0.030) 
          
GY  grade  7  0.062** 0.065** 0.106** 0.112** 0.040*  0.048** 0.080*  0.098** 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.032) (0.030) 
          
GY  grade  9  0.059** 0.062** 0.101** 0.107** 0.033*  0.042** 0.067*  0.085** 
  (0.010) (0.009) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.032) (0.029) 
Notes: + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01; heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses; 
RF = reduced form estimate (effect of assigned relative age); IV = instrumental variables estimate (effect of 
actual relative age instrumented by assigned relative age); control variables are: parents' education level, student 
sex, immigrant status, whether parents read daily to child at pre-school age; all regressions control for state. 
 
At this point it should be noted that – as in most other studies following the same 
identification strategy – assigned relative age proves to be a good instrumental variable for 
actual relative age in a technical sense. F-statistics and partial R-squared values of the 
instrument in the first stage regression exceed thresholds of weak instrument by considerable 
margins. For instance in the full sample, the F-statistics are 4,422 in the regression without 
and 4,677 in the regression with individual control variables included. The partial R-squared 
is .173 in both cases. In the restricted sample, the F-statistics are 907 and 918 and partial R-
squared values are .198 and .192, respectively. However, given that nearly 90 percent of the 
students enrol at the assigned age and only 5 percent repeat class in primary school, it would 
be surprising to find assigned age a weak instrument for actual age at recommendation. 
The second set of results in Table 3 uses the sample restricted to students born 
immediately before and after the threshold. As explained above, this sample restriction serves 
to substantiate the exogeneity assumption regarding month of birth. We argued that parental 
characteristics which influence student achievement might also be related to seasonal 
variations in fertility. Still, family planning is imprecise enough to assume that being born a 
few weeks before or after the school entry cut-off date is a chance event and hence   16
uncorrelated with any omitted and unobserved family characteristics. Moreover, other 
potential seasonal variation of students' characteristics with month of birth such has health or 
personality should be negligible. 
In the restricted sample, we find a net effect of assigned relative age of about 7 to 8 
percentage points, which is slightly smaller than the effect in the full sample. However, due to 
the large standard error in the restricted sample, the effects are not statistically different.  
If there was no early and late enrolment or grade retention, the assigned relative age 
effect would be as large as 15 to 17 percentage points, as can be inferred from the IV 
estimations. Again, these findings are in the same range as those in the full sample, and they 
suggest that – as far as Gymnasium recommendation are concerned – age disadvantages are 
effectively reduced by about one half through the remaining flexibility of the system. 
We now continue by studying how the relative age effect dissipates through the school 
career. Table 3 also shows the effects of a one year age difference on the probability of 
visiting Gymnasium in grade 5 (i.e. immediately following recommendation), grade 7, and 
grade 9. For instance, the full sample reduced form estimates without control variables are 7.8 
percentage points in grade 5, 6.2 percentage points in grade 7 and 5.9 percentage points in 
grade 9. In other words, by grade 9, the initial disadvantage of younger students is reduced by 
more than one third. This finding is robust across estimation methods (OLS vs. IV), samples 
(full sample vs. restricted sample) and specifications (with or without the inclusion of 
individual background control variables). Moreover, the effect of relative age is statistically 
different from zero regardless of the specification chosen. 
The mechanism by which the age effect dissipates is simple. As noted earlier, the 
proportion of students attending Gymnasium falls over time. However, this is a selective 
process. The age gradient of Gymnasium recommendations and attendance becomes flatter 
because more older than younger students do not attend Gymnasium in spite of such 
recommendation. This can be explained by the fact that parents can always decide to send 
their child to a secondary school type below recommendation but not above recommendation. 
Judging from our analysis, the parents' decisions counteract the relative age effect. Moreover, 
more older than younger students drop out of Gymnasium between grades 5 and 9, which 
again reduces the relative age bias in the primary school recommendation. This is illustrated 
in Figure 3, which shows, by relative assigned age, the difference between the proportion of 
students attending Gymnasium in grades 5, 7, and 9, respectively, and the proportion of 
students who received a recommendation for Gymnasium. The percentage difference can be 
interpreted as a net drop-out rate. For instance, among students with the lowest assigned   17
relative age, the proportion attending Gymnasium in grade 7 is 3.1 percentage points lower 
than the proportion who received a recommendation for Gymnasium (see the dashed line). 
Among the students with the highest assigned age, this difference is 6.4 percentage points. 







































0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Relative assigned age at recommendation (in months)
Grade 5 Grade 7 Grade 9
 
 
Figure 3: Difference between the proportion of students attending Gymnasium in grades 5, 7, and 9 and the 
proportion of students who received a recommendation for Gymnasium, by relative assigned age (sample 
restricted to states with 4 year primary schools). 
 
 
6.2 Six grade primary schools 
In the two German states with six year primary schools (Berlin and Brandenburg), 
students receive their recommendation when they are on average two years older than their 
peers in states with four grade primary schools. In this section we will study whether delaying 
the age at recommendation by two years reduces the age bias. As mentioned before, our data 
do not allow us to distinguish whether June born students in Berlin have entered school as the 
youngest group (if they lived in West Berlin) or as the oldest group (if they lived in East 
Berlin). We have thus excluded all June born students from Berlin from our sample. 
The regression results for Berlin and Brandenburg are shown in Table 4. We basically 
ran the same regressions for this much smaller sample as for students in four year primary 
school states, of course except those for attending Gymnasium in grade 5 (when everyone   18
attended primary school). First, we find statistically significant relative age effects on the 
probability of receiving a Gymnasium recommendation across all samples, specifications and 
estimation methods. Second, although in the full sample the estimated effect sizes are 
somewhat smaller than those we find for the four year primary schools, the respective 
differences are not statistically significant. Thus six year primary schools do not solve the 




Table 4: Reduced form and IV-estimates of relative age effects on the probability of getting a Gymnasium 
recommendation and attending Gymnasium in grades 7 and 9 in states with six grade primary schools (Berlin, 
Brandenburg). 
  Full sample (N = 2,576)  Cut-off date sample (N = 432) 

















Dependent  variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
GY  recommended  0.076* 0.095**  0.108* 0.136**  0.103* 0.111* 0.158* 0.170* 
  (0.032) (0.030) (0.046) (0.044) (0.050) (0.046) (0.078) (0.073) 
          
GY  grade  7  0.058+ 0.077**  0.083+ 0.110* 0.086+ 0.091+ 0.132+ 0.139+ 
  (0.032) (0.030) (0.046) (0.043) (0.049) (0.046) (0.077) (0.073) 
          
GY  grade  9  0.049 0.069*  0.070 0.098*  0.081 0.086+  0.124 0.132+ 
  (0.032) (0.029) (0.046) (0.043) (0.049) (0.046) (0.077) (0.072) 
Notes: + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01; heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses; 
RF = reduced form estimate (effect of assigned relative age); IV = instrumental variables estimate (effect of 
actual relative age instrumented by assigned relative age); control variables are: parents' education level, student 
sex, immigrant status, whether parents read daily to child at pre-school age; all regressions control for state. 
 
Third, with respect to actual Gymnasium attendance in grades 7 and 9, the relative age 
bias gradually levels off and eventually becomes statistically insignificant when individual 
background is not controlled for. Although insignificant, the effects of relative age remain 
sizeable: we find an eleven-month age advantage with respect to grade 9 Gymnasium 
attendance of 4.9 percentage points in the full sample and 8.1 percentage points in the cut-off 
point sample. When individual background is controlled for, the estimated reduced form 
effects are 6.9 and 8.6 percentage points, respectively, and they are both statistically different 
from zero. To summarize, we find no evidence that six year primary schools are more 
beneficial to younger students than four year primary schools. This holds in the short run – 
                                                           
5 This stands in some contrast to the earlier finding that the recommendation rate gradient 
with respect to parental education is smaller in states with six-year primary schools. An 
alternative explanation for this finding would be a smaller ability difference between children 
of high and low-education parents in such states.   19
with respect to Gymnasium recommendations – as well as in the medium run – with respect to 
actual attendance. 
 
6.3 Four grade primary schools plus orientation stage 
As explained above, some German states chose a third way of organizing the transition 
between primary and secondary schools by introducing a two-year orientation stage 
(including grades 5 and 6). The explicit aim of the orientation stage – abolished recently – 
was to improve the education system by providing a smoother link between primary and 
secondary schools and to make sure that students receive the "correct" secondary school track 
recommendation. The orientation stage combined characteristics of both primary and 
secondary schools. Students were taught together in most subjects, but there was also some 
internal tracking in key subjects such as German and mathematics. 
 
Table 5: Reduced form and IV-estimates of relative age effects on the probability of getting a Gymnasium 
recommendation and attending Gymnasium in grades 7 and 9 in states with four grade primary schools plus 
orientation stage (Niedersachsen, Bremen). 
  Full sample (N = 2,762)  Cut-off date sample (N = 488) 

















Dependent  variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
GY  recommended  0.098** 0.074** 0.306** 0.218** 0.035  0.037  0.142  0.145 
  (0.029) (0.026) (0.100) (0.082) (0.044) (0.040) (0.185) (0.158) 
          
GY  grade  7  0.089**  0.064*  0.278**  0.189*  0.014 0.005 0.056 0.018 
  (0.029) (0.027) (0.101) (0.083) (0.044) (0.040) (0.183) (0.156) 
          
GY  grade  9  0.073*  0.047+  0.227*  0.138+  0.022 0.019 0.088 0.073 
  (0.029) (0.026) (0.098) (0.080) (0.043) (0.039) (0.181) (0.154) 
Notes: + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01; heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses; 
RF = reduced form estimate (effect of assigned relative age); IV = instrumental variables estimate (effect of 
actual relative age instrumented by assigned relative age); control variables are: parents' education level, student 
sex, immigrant status, whether parents read daily to child at pre-school age; all regressions control for state. 
 
Whether the orientation stage was successful in improving the allocation of students to 
secondary school types can also be judged by the size of the relative age bias in Gymnasium 
recommendation and attendance rates. Our results – derived from regression analyses along 
the same lines those above – are shown in Table 5. As it turns out, they are quantitatively 
similar to what we have obtained before. In the full sample, the estimated reduced form effect 
of having the highest rather than the lowest assigned relative age is 9.8 percentage points 
without control variables and 7.4 percentage points with control variables. The effect 
diminishes in secondary school but remains sizeable and statistically significant until grade 9.   20
The full sample instrumental variables estimates, which measure the relative age effect 
in the absence of flexible enrolment and grade retention are much larger than in states with 
four or six year primary schools. Controlling for individual characteristics, our estimates 
suggest a difference of nearly 22 percentage points between the youngest and oldest students. 
This is largely due to the fact that early as well as late enrolment was more common in 
Niedersachsen and Bremen than in the other states (cf. Figure 2). For instance, 45 percent of 
the June born in Niedersachsen and Bremen enrolled late while the corresponding figure in 
the other 14 states is on average 20 percent. In essence our results indicate that – in terms of 
the relative age bias – nearly nothing was gained by introducing an orientation stage, but 
flexible enrolment had a very large bias reducing effect. Finally, we find considerably smaller 
and insignificant effects of relative age on Gymnasium recommendations and attendance in 
the restricted sample. However, because of large standard errors, the results are also generally 
not significantly different from the full sample results. 
 
7. Discussion 
In this paper, we study birthday effects in the German school system. As in most other 
countries, school entry is subject to a cut-off date rule. Children who are born before a 
specific cut-off date are admitted to school in that year, children born after the cut-off date are 
admitted one year later. Thus there will be an eleven month difference in assigned relative age 
between children born in the month before the cut-off date and those born in the month after 
the cut-off date. Relatively older children are relatively more mature, perform better in school 
and have a higher level of social competence. Perhaps younger children also have problems to 
assert themselves in a group of older children. 
Although birthday effects have been documented in many countries, they do not raise 
too many concerns because one would generally believe that such birthday effects level off 
when children get older. However, in the German school system, there is more reason to 
worry than elsewhere. Birthday effects may be long-lasting because most children are 
separated into different types of schools on the basis of their scholastic achievement at the age 
of 10, i.e. when birthday effects are still relatively strong. 
We therefore study the effect of relative age on a child's chances of getting a primary 
school recommendation for Gymnasium and of actually attending Gymnasium, the most 
academic and prestigious of Germany's secondary school tracks. Using data from the German 
PISA-E study, we find that an eleven month difference in assigned relative age is associated 
with a ten percentage point difference in receiving a Gymnasium recommendation in grade 4   21
and a six percentage point difference in actually attending Gymnasium in grade 9. This is the 
net birthday effect observed in the German school system. 
The age effect would be even larger if there was no possibility of early and late 
enrolment, if the parents had no influence on the secondary school choice, and if there was no 
grade retention. However, the relatively young children have a higher probability of delaying 
school entry and of repeating classes in primary school. Thus some of the children with the 
lowest assigned age are actually among the oldest in their class (and vice versa), which 
increases their chances of getting a Gymnasium recommendation. We estimate that selective 
enrolment and grade retention, which reflect both the school's and the parents' information 
about the relative maturity of a child, reduce the birthday effect by about 40%. From the 
perspective of the individual parents, it does make sense to deliberately delay the school entry 
of "marginal children", or to have them repeat one class in primary school in order to give 
them a head start in their education career. 
We substantiate our findings by performing the analyses on a sample restricted to 
students born in the two months immediately before and after the cut-off date. The overall 
evidence found in this paper is that results in this restricted sample restricted are not different 
from the full sample results. We interpret this as evidence that a selective timing of births 
does drive the full sample results. 
The birthday effect also raises a normative question. Should the assigned age matter 
for the track choice recommendations, given that assigned age is random and 
recommendations predetermine career opportunities? Probably not. A solution often proposed 
to the problem of age biased recommendations is to abandon the current form of the tracking 
system altogether or track children at a later age, as is common practice in other countries. As 
was discussed above, such a regime change might not only reduce educational inequality but 
also increase aggregate performance. Since some of the 16 German states have a six year 
primary school system, we had the opportunity to perform a (limited) test of the idea that late 
tracking reduces the age effect. However, we find no evidence that the age effect is weaker 
when recommendation are given in grade 6 rather than grade 4. One reason may be that 
tracking after 6
th grade is still too early. 
In practice, German parents have at least some limited influence on the secondary 
track choice and we believe that parents should know about the age effect, so that they can 
possibly counteract biased recommendations by the primary school. Still, some injustice 
generated by school entrance or exit laws has probably to be accepted as long as children are 
born during the entire year.    22
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